Combatting terrorism through fusion centers: useful lessons from other experiences? by Garcia, Andres de Castro et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2017
Combatting terrorism through fusion centers:
useful lessons from other experiences?
Garcia, Andres de Castro; Matei, Florina Cristiana;
Bruneau, Thomas C.
Taylor & Francis
Andres de Castro Garcia, Florina Cristiana Matei & Thomas C. Bruneau, (2017)
"Combatting Terrorism Through Fusion Centers: Useful Lessons From Other
Experiences?", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, v.30
#4, 723-742,
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/55908
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 30: 723–742, 2017 
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 
ISSN: 0885-0607 print/1521-0561 online 
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2017.1297119 
ANDRES DE CASTRO GARCIA, FLORINA CRISTIANA 
MATEI, and THOMAS C. BRUNEAU 
Combatting Terrorism Through Fusion 
Centers: Useful Lessons From Other 
Experiences? 
none defined  
Dr. Andres de Castro Garcia is a Lecturer and Researcher at the Universidad 
Tecnica del Norte (UTN), Ibarra, Ecuador. He earned his Ph.D. in 
International Security at the Spanish Ministry of Defense’s Instituto 
Universitario General Gutierrez Mellado (IUGM-UNED) in Madrid, and a law 
degree from the University of Salamanca, also in Spain. Dr. de Castro 
specializes in Intelligence and Security Studies. 
Dr. Florina Cristiana Matei has been a Research Associate and Lecturer at the 
Center for Civil-Military Relations at the United States Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, since 2003. A native of Romania, she earned her 
B.S. in Physics (Nuclear Interactions and Elementary Particles) at the University 
of Bucharest, then worked for the Romanian Ministry of Defense as a civilian 
subject matter expert. She later earned an M.A. in International Security Affairs 
and Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School, and her Ph.D. in 
the War Studies Department at Kings College London. A frequent author on 
security matters, she was co-editor, with Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau, of The 
Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations (London: Routledge, 2012). 
Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau is emeritus Distinguished Professor of National Security 
Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, where he 
taught from 1987 to 2014. He was Chairman of the National Security Affairs 
Department from 1989 to 1995. From 2000–2004 he was Director of the NPS’s 
Center for Civil Military Relations. Previously, he taught Political Science at 
McGill University, Montreal, Canada. Dr. Bruneau received his B.A. from the 
California State University at San Jose, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the 
University of California at Berkeley. He was a Fulbright Scholar in India in 
1962–1963, and in Brazil in 1985–1986. A specialist on Portugal, Brazil, and 
Latin America, he has published more than a dozen books in English and 
Portuguese.  


































European nations might consider an institutional option in their ongoing 
fight against terrorism. Research on intelligence reform globally indicates 
that certain institutional innovations to combating terrorism that may not 
have been seriously considered by decisionmakers in some European 
countries. 
International news reporting on the effectiveness of the intelligence services 
and the police in France, and even more so in Belgium, has been extremely 
negative. The New York Times during the Spring of 2016, following the 
attacks by Islamic State (IS/ISIS) on 22 March, which killed at least 
32 people and injured more than 300 at the international airport and in 
the center of Brussels, published a series of articles demonstrating the 
weakness of Belgian intelligence. Its editorial of 12 April was titled 
“Europe’s Urgent Security Challenge,” and an article in The Economist of 
2 April 2016 was titled “No Poirots: Belgian Police are Flummoxed by 
IS.” What is more, most scholarly work remains extremely pessimistic 
about the potential for developing more effective intelligence against 
terrorism.1 Not surprisingly, intelligence and counterintelligence are topics 
of primary concern of the European Union (EU) and its member states.2 
While a great deal has been published about intelligence failures, the 
literature on intelligence successes is rather meager.3 While keeping a 
fundamental consideration in mind, as captured in the following statement: 
“Those who know don’t say, and those who say don’t know,” ample 
evidence is available to suggest that the intelligence agencies may not be 
up to the demands posed by the current terrorist threat promoted by 
DAESH/IS/ISIS. The attacks in San Bernardino, California, on 2 December 
2015 in which 14 people were killed and 22 seriously injured, and in 
Orlando, Florida, on 12 June 2016 in which 49 people were killed and 53 
seriously injured, make clear that no country is immune to mass deaths 
whether termed “terrorism,” “hate crimes,” or “violent extremism.”4 
European countries desire to never again repeat the horrible experiences of 
the Gestapo, STASI, KGB, Securitate, and other instruments of state 
security in dictatorships. But countries can overcome their past, as did 
Spain, a dictatorship between 1939 and 1975, in which the security 
apparatus was an arm of repression, and Romania, in which the Securitate 
was widely recognized as the epitome of a Communist dictatorship’s state 
security instrument which “disappeared” and intimidated people. That 
these two countries have been able to overcome their past, recognize the 
current threats to their sovereignty and the well-being of their people, and 
create such effective intelligence agencies as Spain’s CNI5 and Romania’s 
SRI, both under democratic civilian control, lends optimism that other 
countries can follow suit. 
Three major bases motivate an awareness of the need to reexamine the 
European intelligence systems and implement innovations. First, the EU 
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has formulated very impressive documents whereby its member states are 
expected to implement recommended plans and processes for organizations 
that are ostensibly tasked with internal or domestic security.6 That internal 
or domestic security is an important issue for the population is validated 
in the most recent survey by the EU on the general topic of security. That 
the first sentence of the Introduction to this survey: “Security is arguably a 
greater issue for Europeans in 2015 than at any time since a generation 
ago” comes as no surprise.7 As the report states: “Roughly half of the 
respondents (49) identified terrorism as one of the EU’s most important 
security challenges. This is a substantial increase from the 33 of 
respondents who mentioned terrorism in 2011 (Special Eurobarometer 
371).”8 Further, 68 percent of the respondents think that the challenge of 
terrorism is likely to increase over the next three years.9 The fieldwork for 
the EU survey was conducted in March 2015, after the Paris Charlie 
Hebdo terrorist attacks in January 2015, when 17 people were killed, and 
the attack in February in Copenhagen when two were killed, but before 
the truly horrific terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 in which 
more than 130 were killed and the attacks in Brussels of 22 March 2016. 
The gruesome evidence on terrorism in Europe, or perpetrated against 
foreigners, including Europeans throughout the Middle East, Tunisia, 
Mali, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, and Turkey, is contained in the 
international data bases on terrorism that are readily available on the 
Web.10 With ISIS on the defensive militarily in Middle East and North 
Africa, ongoing terrorist attacks in Europe and beyond will continue. 
But the most telling datum in this same Eurobarometer Report is its 
Question (QA9) which reads: “In your view, what role should each of the 
following play in ensuring the security of citizens in (Our Country)?” This 
is a closed question. Oddly, the six options do NOT include the intelligence 
organizations.11 Their absence on this list of the primary organizations— 
civilian or/and military—in most countries that are tasked to identify 
potential terrorists and avoid terrorist attacks raises the question of why 
they are not included. Perhaps because intelligence remains a national vs. 
EU responsibility. 
Second, a book purportedly on how countries integrate or “fuse” the 
intelligence product, Fusion Centres Throughout Europe, was produced by 
the Belgian Standing Committee on Intelligence and Security.12 It reviews 
the status and structure of the Belgian fusion center and those of 19 other 
European countries. But the discussion is extremely formulaic, and these 
“fusion centers” deal exclusively with national level intelligence agencies, 
except in the case of Spain, which deals with linking national intelligence 
with police intelligence, a unit understood as either the Spanish National 
Police (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) or Guardia Civil (the Spanish Military 
Police, akin to the Gendarmerie in France or Carabinieri in Italy). 
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While a European-wide intelligence organization now exists, the general 
awareness is that it has no capabilities to collect, and a very limited ability 
to fuse, intelligence from information and intelligence that derives from the 
national intelligence services of the EU members.13 By its very nature, as a 
secret activity based largely on trust and reciprocity in exchanging a piece 
of information for another—an action not possible in the EU as it 
currently exists—intelligence for the time being remains fundamentally a 
national activity, with very limited incentive for change.14 Those European 
countries that invest more in intelligence and have better capabilities are 
not willing to share if there is no reciprocity. The fact that Eurobarometer 
#432 does not include intelligence agencies in efforts at combatting 
terrorism is telling. 
Page XXI of Fusion Centres Throughout Europe highlights a key challenge. 
The report states: “Despite impressive progress, the relations between the 
intelligence and the law enforcement communities remain a ‘work in 
progress.’”15 Given the scope of the threat of terrorism in many European 
countries, and the relatively small size of the intelligence agencies, the 
police should arguably be involved in order to respond most effectively to 
these threats. That this is possible is evidenced by the experience of Spain, 
which, following decades of terrorist actions and threats from the ETA, 
and more recently from al-Qaeda, has developed a system in which the 
National Police and the Guardia Civil are key components.16 The longer 
and far better documented U.S. experience with its Terrorist Early 
Warning system, and more recently the Intelligence Fusion Centers, might 
prove relevant for other European countries. 
While no reliable figures on the size of the intelligence services in European 
countries are available, data on the size of the police forces are accessible.17 
And, considering the nature of the threat, and the tremendous damage that 
can be and has been done, failure to draw upon the police is not a luxury any 
European country can forgo. 
BACKGROUND TO THE SPANISH AND U.S. EXPERIENCES  
IN RESPONDING TO TERRORISM 
Development of Spain’s Counterterrorism Intelligence Structure 
Spain’s robust counterterrorism system was designed to take into 
consideration the country’s characteristics and level of terrorist threat. In 
1958, during the Franco regime (1939–1975), the terrorist group Euskadi 
Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom—ETA) started its terrorist 
activities in an effort to achieve the independence of the Basque Country, 
on the border with France. After the coronation of King Juan Carlos I in 
1975 and Spain’s post-Franco democratization, the ETA retained its killing 
agenda. Its activities triggered a coup d’état attempt in 1981 in which a 
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part of the military and the Guardia Civil sought to reinstall an authoritarian 
regime that could defeat terrorism by using non-democratic means. But King 
Juan Carlos managed to stop the coup, and Spain returned to normal 
although the ETA continued to engage in terrorist activities. The security 
sector then began to adapt to the level of threat and to coordinate efforts 
to fully engage in confronting it. Even at this early stage, a certain level of 
coordination developed between the two main police forces—the National 
Police and Guardia Civil—and the Intelligence Service (SECED) that was 
built mainly to confront the terrorist threat. 
While internal cooperation had become efficient, international 
cooperation remained a big challenge. In the ETA’s initial period as a 
terrorist group, France was still very skeptical regarding Spain’s 
democratization. Newspaper articles written in the late 1970s are indicative 
of this skepticism.18 But, as Spain’s democratization became more solid 
and France realized the security problem that ETA could pose, 
cooperation increased, especially between the Gendarmerie Nationale 
Française and the Guardia Civil, which led to the allowing of armed 
Spanish police officers in France after the assassination of two unarmed 
Guardia Civil personnel in Southern France in December 2007.19 
The history of the current National Intelligence Service can be divided into 
three phases, starting with SECED’s creation in 1972 until 1977 when 
Lieutenant General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado—a former Army 
intelligence officer and Vice President—and Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez 
created the CESID, an intelligence agency that was active until Prime 
Minister Jose Maria Aznar decided CNI was a necessity, two years prior 
to the 11 March 2004 bombings in Madrid, a true breaking point. 
The CNI, whose creation was a keystone of the Spanish system, continued to 
improve as it adapted to the new challenges that Spain was facing at the 
beginning of the 21st century. It maintained the former CESID’s hybrid focus, 
i.e., on both domestic and foreign threats. This was an obvious decision, given 
the difficulty in differentiating between the two, especially because Spain’s 
biggest threat, the ETA, had both domestic and international components. 
Ever since its creation in 1844 as a militarized police force, the Guardia 
Civil has had an intelligence gathering function. It was included in Article 
26 of the Cartilla del Guardia Civil, the institutional code that specifies the 
identity and functions of the force.20 That capacity was crystalized in the 
creation of the Servicio de Información de la Guardia Civil (Guardia Civil 
Intelligence Service) in 1941. Since then, the Service has done intelligence 
work, against both ETA and Islamic terrorism. The Spanish National 
Police also has an intelligence structure, derived from a central unit, the 
Comisaría General de Información, and intelligence cells in each of the 
country’s fifty provinces (Brigadas Provinciales de Policía Judicial), and 
one in each of the Spanish cities in Africa—Ceuta and Melilla. Depending 
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on its nature if the threat is perceived to be of a provincial level—such as 
a citizen collecting money to fund ISIS—the Brigadas Provinciales would 
be in charge of collecting and processing information leading to the arrest 
if a crime seems to have been committed. The Comisaria General de 
Información would act only if the nature of the crime or threat is greater. 
Fusion Centers 
Two months after the March 2004 bombings in Madrid, Spain created the 
first Intelligence Fusion Center to ensure cooperation among the various 
agencies: the Centro Nacional de Coordinación Antierrorista (National 
Coordination Center Against Terrorism—CNCA). By agreement of the 
Ministers’ Council it integrated the National Police, Guardia Civil, and the 
National Intelligence Center (CNI). Its membership included 36 Police and 
Guardia Civil personnel and five CNI agents, and was directed by each of 
the forces, rotating every two years.21 As a very strategic component, it 
was taken under the Ministry of Internal Affairs during Alfredo Pérez 
Rubalcaba’s administration as Minister (2006–2011). 
Aware that having Intelligence Fusion Centers target organized crime was 
an urgent need in Spain due to the strengthening of different crime networks, 
the government in 2006 created the Centro de Inteligencia contra el Crimen 
Organizado (Intelligence Center against Organized Crime—CICO) through 
Royal Decree 991/2006. Emulating the CNCA, CICO was comprised of 
the same institutions. The Center, which included 75 police officers and 
Guardias Civiles, with support from the Servicio de Vigilancia Aduanera 
(customs), was put in charge of providing intelligence to the government in 
organized crime-related matters. 
Ten years after the creation of CNCA and eight after CICO, the 
government in 2014 became increasingly aware of how terrorism and 
organized crime frequently act together and how, more often than not, 
organized crime serves as the main way of financing terrorism. That 
realization led to the unification of the two units into the Centro de 
Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado (Intelligence 
Center against Terrorism and Organized Crime—CITCO), created in 2014 
by Royal Decree 873/2014.22 CITCO is a purely analytical organization.23 
The main goal was to establish common criteria and coordination among 
the different institutions engaged in countering organized crime and 
terrorism, thus, avoiding duplication.24 
Analysis of the Interagency Process and CITCO in Spain 
One of the biggest challenges faced by Spain’s security forces was interagency 
competition. Bureaucratic obstacles and walls were part of the problem, as 
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were historical legacies: each force has its own tradition, approach, and 
history. Therefore, the more conservative Guardia Civil, with its military 
structure, has sometimes culturally clashed with the more liberal and 
civilian-oriented National Police. 
Nevertheless, despite the routine interagency challenges, these agencies 
have ultimately worked together very effectively, particularly since the 
creation of CITCO. No evidence has emerged of egregious failures or 
clashes among CITCO’s components in carrying out their joint mission 
of combating terrorism and organized crime.25 To the contrary, statistics 
reveal the detention of more than one hundred suspects of terrorism since 
2015 as a result of their work.26 That represents significant success. While 
some previous problems continue—for instance, although CITCO is 
legally the sole coordinating structure, where some groups work on 
terrorism and others on organized crime, those working on terrorism 
tend to be given more resources, credit, and political support27— 
coordination, sharing, and cooperation among the CNI, Guardia Civil, 
and the Spanish Police has been very effective. Meanwhile, the 
competition, particularly between the Guardia Civil and the Police, has 
been rather “healthy,” in that it has sought a balance of power between 
the two institutions, with each checking on the other.28 Moreover, the 
laudable relationship of the Guardia Civil and Spanish National Police 
with CNI is based on complementarity versus competition.29 For 
example, intelligence the Guardia Civil receives either directly or via CNI 
that is not of interest but may be needed by the Police will be 
immediately shared, and vice versa.30 Also, since the CNI is not legally 
allowed to perform arrests it shares necessary information with the Police 
and/or Guardia Civil so they can proceed to arrest. 
Overall, Spain has been increasingly successful in developing an 
interagency process, including fusion centers, for combating terrorism and 
organized crime. These accomplishments have been made possible by a 
direct jihadi terrorist threat to Spain and the resulting institutional 
awareness of the need for cooperation and coordination in order to 
effectively tackle this threat while preserving democratic values. 
Policymakers and individual security institutions have become aware of the 
need for including the police and intelligence services in fighting terrorism. 
In addition, CITCO is the institution in charge of representing Spain in 
multinational environments and operations, including the international 
police operation launched by Europol, “Ciconia Alba 2016,” with its 
stronger organized crime component.31 The fact that Spain’s national level 
intelligence is already centralized has facilitated its international cooperation. 
While the CITCO may not be well known to the Spanish public, many 
citizens acknowledge the effectiveness and professionalism of the Guardia 
Civil in the fight against terrorism. This has a historical explanation, based 
AND  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME  30,  NUMBER  4                                                                                                                         


































on the fact that the ETA had a very rural component, as had the Guardia 
Civil, making it the main institution responsible for that counter-terrorist 
activity. The current status of intelligence in Spain represents a significant 
accomplishment given the fact the country has yet to develop a robust 
intelligence culture, although the initial steps have been taken, especially 
since the 2004 bombings. 
INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE U.S. AND THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE 
FUSION CENTERS 
In response to the Islamist terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 
September 2001 (9/11) experts and officials concluded that America’s 
national security and defense structures had to change dramatically to deal 
with escalating international terrorism. The first major effort to reorganize 
the U.S. national security and defense structures after 9/11 emerged from 
the findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, the 9/11 Commission, which was created by Congress and 
the White House (Public Law 107-306, 27 November 2002) to find out 
what went wrong, and who, if anyone, was to blame for the failure to 
prevent the attacks. The Commission and its report focused on three main 
areas of reform, one of which, titled “Reforming the Institutions of 
Government,” includes the Intelligence Community (IC). 
The CIA’s Central Role 
Initially, the IC was fragmented without coordination until the creation of 
the Central Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act of 1947. But 
by 2001, the U.S. Intelligence Community consisted of fifteen separate 
agencies, or major organizations within agencies, engaged in some part of 
the intelligence cycle. Despite that enlargement, problems remained. 
Professor Amy Zegart in 1999 identified a critical weakness of the resulting 
bureaucracy: 
the Central Intelligence Agency never succeeded in centralizing 
intelligence. Instead of exerting discipline over the far-flung intelligence 
community, the CIA only added to the crowd, producing its own 
reports and developing its own independent collection capabilities. In 
addition, the agency pursued a series of illegal and quasi-legal activities 
that eventually triggered citizen outcries and congressional intervention.32 
In 1949, just two years after passage of the National Security Act, the first 
proposal to reorganize the IC was formulated but never successfully 
implemented. Over the half-century between 1949 and the 9/11 
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Commission Report, none of the subsequent proposals was successful. As a 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states: 
Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence 
Community have repeatedly emerged from commissions and 
committees created by either the executive or legislative branches. The 
heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence, and 
the great influence of the Departments of State and Defense have 
inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans from within the 
Intelligence Community itself.33 
In an internal, yet unclassified, study, “The U.S. Intelligence Community: 
Reform Studies since 1947,” Michael Warner, chief historian to the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, examined “the origins, context, and 
results of 14 significant studies that have surveyed and sought to improve 
the American intelligence system since 1947.”34 The study demonstrated 
that some reforms during the intervening fifty-seven years were successful. 
In concluding his report, Warner highlighted the main structural obstacles 
to reform: 
Intelligence reform is difficult because it involves two branches of 
government—Congress which diffuses its two houses’ authority among 
their committees, and the Executive Branch, whose departments and 
agencies each respond to both political and institutional pressures. 
Within the Executive Branch, the Intelligence Community itself is 
fragmented, with the principal fault line between the DCI and his CIA 
on the one hand and the Secretary of Defense and his Department on 
the other. The studies we’ve examined nonetheless reveal that, despite 
these systemic difficulties, reform is possible when most of the key 
political and bureaucratic actors agree that something must change— 
even if they do not all agree on exactly what that change should be.35 
The impetus for major change was ultimately produced by the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001 and the 9/11 Commission created by the 
legislative and executive branches on 27 November 2002. 
The 567-page 9/11 Commission Report outlined the emergence of terrorist 
threats to the United States, and described the fecklessness of the 
government’s response to the emerging threats. It pointed out, for 
example, that “The road to 9/11 again illustrates how the large, unwieldy 
U.S. government tended to underestimate a threat that grew ever greater,” 
and put heavy blame on the bureaucratic or organizational features of the 
security system.36 
In view of the Commission’s analysis of the problems with U.S. 
intelligence, the Report’s last chapter is unsurprisingly titled: “How To Do 
it? A Different Way of Organizing the Government.” Four of the five 
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subsections in that chapter dealt with “unity of effort,” two of them 
specifically with intelligence and information sharing. The Report made 
seven specific recommendations for intelligence reform: 
1. create the position of Director of National Intelligence; 
2. set up a National Counterterrorism Center; 
3. create a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) national security workforce; 
4. define new missions for the CIA director; 
5. create incentives for information sharing among departments, agencies, and 
sub-agencies in the IC; 
6. stimulate government-wide information sharing; and 
7. promote homeland airspace defense. 
In view of the political layers involved, including but not limited to 
bureaucratic politics, which both exacerbated the lack of cooperation 
among the agencies and promoted general inertia, the fact that the 
recommendations were enacted into law, and to a high degree 
implemented, is important in itself. Political momentum carried the 
Commission’s recommendations into law through the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Several government reports have 
assessed the degree to which the recommendations have been 
implemented.37 Because of the legislative branch’s close involvement in 
these matters, the Congressional Research Service publishes unclassified 
quarterly reports on “Intelligence Issues for Congress,” which analyze the 
status of Intelligence Community reform initiatives. 
The requirement to reform the IC’s structures and processes has been 
addressed through several important institutional innovations, including 
the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the 
establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center; and new missions 
for the CIA director. To address the issue of resources, the legislation 
created incentives, including funds and personnel benefits, for a national 
security workforce that would promote information sharing among 
agencies government-wide.38 
While all seven of the Report’s recommendations have to some degree been 
implemented, items (5) to create incentives for information sharing among 
departments, agencies, and sub-agencies in the IC and (6) to stimulate 
government-wide information sharing best enable the Intelligence Fusion 
Centers to fit in as an important element in U.S. counter-terrorism strategies. 
They are a component of the U.S. Information Sharing Environment (ISE) 
established by the 2004 legislation to facilitate information sharing, access, 
and collaboration to more effectively combat terrorism.39 
According to a Congressional Research Service report on ISIS and 
“homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 
2001” intelligence fusion centers “play a notable role in information and 
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intelligence sharing, bringing together federal, state, and local law enforcement 
and security professionals working on counterterrorism and crime issues.”40 
The formal definition of a Fusion Center is: “a collaborative effort of two 
or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the 
center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, 
investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”41 Intelligence 
processes through which information is collected, integrated, evaluated, 
analyzed, and disseminated are a primary focus. Fusion involves the 
exchange of information from different sources, including law 
enforcement, public safety, and the private sector. Relevant and actionable 
intelligence results from analysis and data fusion. 
The Fusion Center Guidelines of 2006 and the Baseline Capabilities for 
State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A Supplement to the Fusion 
Center Guidelines, of September 2008 elaborate on the Guidelines and Key 
Elements of Fusion Centers.42 
Fusion Centers—Then and Now 
Fusion centers, or entities that came to be called fusion centers, existed in 
New York and Los Angeles prior to 9/11. A key feature is that they remain 
a local or state-level initiative. Seeing that fusion centers were a useful 
concept, they became central to the 9/11 Commission Report’s items #5 and 
#6. The federal government, especially the Departments of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and of Justice (DOJ), have supported their development. 
As of late 2016 the 78 U.S. fusion centers varied tremendously in focus 
given their origins as meeting state and local needs. The National Strategy 
for Information Sharing (NSIS) stipulates that fusion centers serve as the 
primary focal points within states and localities for the receipt and sharing 
of information on terrorism. Through the NSIS, the federal government 
promotes the centers to achieve a baseline level of capability and to 
ensure compliance with privacy laws in a coordinated effort to become 
interconnected with the federal government and each other in a national 
network of sharing terrorism-related information. 
Have they been successful? Proving a negative is impossible, and outsiders 
have no way of knowing if the fact that terrorist attacks in the U.S. have been 
relatively infrequent is due to terrorists not targeting the U.S. or to effective 
institutional means that stop such attacks. While acknowledging the 
fundamental problem of proving, or disproving, a negative, the following 
observations are possible with regard to the American experience with 
intelligence fusion centers. A common phrase when discussing fusion centers 
with those involved studying them is: “When you have seen one fusion 
center you have seen one fusion center,” meaning that generalizations are 
not possible for the whole range of the current U.S. fusion centers. 
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According to an expert who has ongoing close involvement with virtually all 
fusion centers in the U.S., between one-third and one-half work well.43 In 
addition to analyses and reports by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), only one systematic effort, in the form of a Ph.D. dissertation, has 
been made to assess the effectiveness of a sample of fusion centers. Andrew 
Coffey’s research demonstrated that, according to the stakeholders, most 
fusion centers are perceived to add value. These results have been fed back 
into the process of improving fusion centers, and Coffey is very positive and 
optimistic on the results.44 
On the face of it, the goal of bringing information up from the local level 
and down to the local level from national intelligence organizations in the 
effort to combat terrorism and crime seems to intuitively make sense. But 
several “issues” or challenges are inherent in the process and European 
decisionmakers must now decide whether this is an institutional innovation 
they are willing to explore. 
Fusion Center Difficulties 
Four main problems can be identified. Based on the U.S. experience since 
2005, certain lessons have been learned to deal with or respond to these 
problems. These are not necessarily “solutions” but rather the means 
developed to deal with the challenges. The lessons learned may be relevant 
for some European countries if they decide to further develop relations 
between their intelligence agencies and the police in fighting terrorism. 
Intelligence fusion centers are not a creation of the U.S. federal 
government, but are rather local initiatives. According to the president of 
the National Fusion Center Associations, they are “owned” by state and 
local entities and receive support from civilian agencies of the U.S. 
government.45 Oddly enough while the Department of Defense (DoD) 
component consists of half the agencies or elements of the 17 American IC 
agencies (excluding the CIA, DoS ONR, DEA, DHS, Energy, FBI, and 
Treasury), and more than 80 percent of the total intelligence budget, the 
fusion centers have nothing to do with the DoD. 
1. Financing and Support.  The fusion centers which emerged in 2005 were 
preceded in 1996 by the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) model in large 
American cities, including Los Angeles and New York. While perhaps not 
yet obvious to decisionmakers at the national level, some local officials 
had already become aware of the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland 
following the first World Trade Center bombing incident in 1993. According 
to John P. Sullivan, perhaps the single most important proponent of the 
TEW, they were largely financed by state and local entities, with the largest 
component being in-kind contributions from participating agencies.46 
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Federal funding to fusion center budgets is at the discretion of the state and 
local governments that determine the amount of money from federal grants 
that they allocate to fusion centers each year among a number of competing 
homeland security needs. But they do not have to use the federal funds for 
fusion centers. Moreover, as federal funds have decreased, states and local 
entities have made up the difference out of other funds.47 The DHS and 
DOJ deploy, or assign, either part-time or full-time personnel to fusion 
centers to support their operations and serve as liaisons between the fusion 
centers and federal components. As of July 2010, the DHS had deployed 58 
intelligence officers and the FBI had deployed 74 special agents and analysts 
full time to 38 of the then 72 fusion centers. The DHS and DOJ share 
classified and unclassified homeland security and terrorism information with 
the fusion centers through several information technology networks and 
systems. The DHS reports that it has installed the Homeland Secure Data 
Network, which supports the sharing of federal secret-level intelligence and 
information with state, local, and tribal partners. The DHS also provides an 
unclassified network, the Homeland Security Information Network, which 
allows federal, state, and local homeland security and terrorism-related 
information sharing. The DHS partners with the DOJ to offer fusion 
centers a variety of training and technical assistance programs.48 In short, 
while the 78 fusion centers receive grants from the federal government, as 
well as personnel and technical support, they remain essentially local or 
state-level organizations. This is extremely important both for the input of 
citizens to the process and to increase the effectiveness of local police 
through their access to national-level databases and networks. 
2. The Misconception “Out There” is That the Fusion Centers Deal Only with 
Counterterrorism.  Were this the case it would not be a good use of funds 
since terrorism is not the only—and quite possibly not even the most 
important—local threat or problem. This point became polemical when, 
on 3 October 2012 the staff of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations issued a report criticizing the fusion centers for not 
meaningfully contributing to federal counterterrorism efforts. A joint 
statement from state and local officials argued in response: 
One of the greatest benefits of fusion centers to state, local and tribal law 
enforcement is the ability to maintain an all crimes approach. The law 
enforcement and intelligence communities rely on fusion centers to 
provide information and fusion centers rely on state, local and tribal law 
enforcement to provide information—both to the benefit of connecting 
the dots of high crime areas and indications of terrorism related activity.49 
In short, fusion centers follow an “all crimes, all hazards” approach that 
includes, but is not limited to, terrorism. The focus depends on the locale 
AND  COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME  30,  NUMBER  4                                                                                                                         


































and the time. Thus, a mechanism, the intelligence fusion center, is in place 
which can respond to terrorist threats when they arise. 
3. Europe’s Experiences with the Gestapo, Stasi, and Securitate, among others, 
Create Great Sensitivities to Intelligence, and Particularly Domestic 
Intelligence Services.  Certain sensitivities also exist in the U.S. with the 
exposés of FBI and CIA wrongdoing in the 1970s and the more recent 
exposés of “domestic spying” associated with Edward Snowden and the 
National Security Agency (NSA). The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) actively researches and denounces violations of civil liberties, 
especially those guaranteed in the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Yet the challenge of increasing security in the face of threats 
while simultaneously guaranteeing civil liberties cannot be avoided. In the 
U.S., however, government and non-government organizations (NGOs) such 
as the GAO, the ACLU, the Brennan Institute, and others, as well as 
academics consistently investigate and criticize some fusion centers. Their 
criticisms are normally embraced and the processes improved.50 Nearly all 
fusion centers now have privacy protection rules and regulations in place. 
While an ongoing and inescapable trade-off is present in these issues, 
constant vigilance is encouraged as is utilizing all available means to 
investigate procedures, disseminate information, and seek improvements. 
Notably, in response to ISIS terrorism, the New York Times reported on 15 
April 2016 that “E.U. Lawmakers Vote to Collect Data on Air Passengers.” 
4. Undoubtedly the Greatest Challenge to the “Fusion” Required of the Process 
in Intelligence Fusion Centers is the Blending of Two Totally Different 
Cultures.  The culture of the police, who utilize information in prosecuting 
those suspected of breaking the law, and the national level intelligence 
agencies that collect information, is presumably in line with the “intelligence 
cycle,” for decisionmakers. Although “intelligence-led policing” is a goal in the 
U.S, it is not yet a fact. Attempts to combine the police culture, with its often 
mutually hostile attitudes, many based on very different class and educational 
backgrounds, with the intelligence services’ collection of information for the 
sake of collecting information for decisionmakers, frequently result in a 
“dialogue of the deaf.” Consequently, the main focus in national meetings, 
seminars, and the providing of technology and access to multiple sources of 
information is to meld or fuse information collected at a local level with 
information collected by the national intelligence organizations. Undoubtedly, 
the key element in the fusion is the physical co-location of local police and 
similar peace officers, including some elements of the private sector, with 
national level officials, most often from the FBI, DHS, and ODNI. The main 
obstacle to a successful intelligence fusion center is clearly the clash of the 
different cultures, while the main element promoting success is co-location. 
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NEW ANTI-TERRORISM INITIATIVES 
Terrorism, assiduously promoted by DAESH/ISIS, is a reality in Europe. The 
general awareness is that the intelligence agencies, as currently configured in 
most European countries, are not up to the task of dealing with the threat. 
In both France and Germany major changes are underway seeking to 
improve counterterrorism strategies. The EU, currently discussing new 
initiatives to respond to terrorism, has recently, reluctantly but necessarily, 
agreed to provide information on airline passengers. Most importantly, in 
Spain, and even more so in the U.S., the national level intelligence agencies 
have developed useful links with local level police organizations. Several 
lessons-learned, particularly from the U.S. experience which is more 
extensively documented, but also supported by the experience in Spain, 
might prove useful should other European countries become interested in 
pursuing a similar path. Developments in both Spain and the U.S. clearly 
reveal that threat perception matters and acts as the principal catalyst for 
not only interagency reform, but also for effective intelligence—law 
enforcement coordination, cooperation, and sharing. These efforts have been 
motivated, specifically by the attacks on 9/11 in the U.S. and the internal 
threat posed by ETA in Spain, as well as by the post-2004 security context, 
in which the jihad threat complemented, and admittedly, largely replaced 
the ETA danger. In the U.S., the extensive creation of new organizations 
along with the intelligence fusion centers has led to the development of 
stronger links between national level intelligence organizations and state and 
local police. In Spain, the strengthening of cooperation among the two 
national Police Forces and the National Intelligence Service (CNI) resulted 
first in the creation of the CNCA and CICO, and finally, in the merger 
between the two Fusion Centers into CITCO, an Intelligence Fusion Center 
that allows National Intelligence and Police Intelligence to collaborate in 
meeting perceived threats to the nation’s security. 
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